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The Ontological Diversity of Visual Artworks 
Sherri Irvin 
 
Virtually everyone who has advanced an ontology of art has accepted a constraint to the 
effect that claims about ontology should cohere with the sort of appreciative claims made 
about artworks within a mature and reflective version of critical practice.  In this paper, I 
argue that such a constraint, which I agree is appropriate, rules out a one-size-fits-all 
ontology of contemporary visual art (and thus of visual art in general).  Mature critical 
practice with respect to contemporary art accords artists a significant degree of stipulative 
authority regarding the features and boundaries of their works.  As I will show, this results 
in ontological variation among visual artworks.  Any claim to the effect that all works belong 
to the same ontological category will thus come out false or uninformative.  Interesting, 
substantive claims about ontological status can be made only in relation to specific works; 
that is, we must consider the ontological status of each contemporary artwork individually.  
The only general ontological claim that can be made about visual artworks (and also about 
artworks in other forms) is that they belong to the sort of thing that artists create.  But this 
is not a substantive ontological claim. 
 
The critical practice constraint 
There was a time, a hundred years ago or so, when visual artworks seemed to be pretty 
straightforward things, and the ontology of art might have seemed a correspondingly simple 
problem, especially to those preoccupied with painting.  Artists made paintings by putting 
paint on a support, often a canvas.  Like other products, paintings could be bought and 
sold: the seller would deliver the painted canvas into the hands of the buyer, who now had 
a property right in it.  Paintings could also be destroyed, and the destruction of a painting 
was something like the destruction of your favourite party dress: the physical object didn’t 
necessarily cease to exist, but it lost at least some of the features that made it worth 
looking at.  Similar stories can be told about drawings, carved sculptures and so forth.1  
Moreover, artists spend a great deal of time crafting objects, enthusiasts spend a great deal 
of time viewing them, and museums spend vast resources exhibiting, storing, and 
conserving them.  We refer to the works in question as visual artworks, suggesting that the 
primary appreciative act is one of looking; and what, if not a physical entity, can be looked 
at? 
For these reasons, the temptation has been strong to think that visual artworks 
simply are physical objects.  What could give us grounds for rejecting this straightforward 
idea?  The resistance to the identification of artworks and physical objects has typically been 
grounded, implicitly or explicitly, in some sort of critical practice constraint.  A critical 
practice constraint is a methodological principle to the effect that 
[a]rtworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed to 
what are termed ‘works’ in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that are 
individuated in the way such ‘works’ are or would be individuated[;] and that have 
the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to ‘works’, in that practice.2 
 
1 Artworks with multiple instances, like prints and cast sculptures, have always complicated 
this picture.  In such cases, the artwork cannot be identical to any particular physical object, 
since it can survive the destruction of any particular instance (except, in some cases, the 
last instance). 
2 David Davies, Art as Performance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), p. 18.  In Art as 
Performance, Davies refers to this constraint as the ‘pragmatic constraint’.  He employs the 
term ‘critical practice constraint’, which I favour, in ‘Artwork, Action, and Process’, Acta 
Analytica 20 (1988), 131-153.  As Davies notes, Jerrold Levinson explicitly employs a 
similar constraint in ‘What a Musical Work Is’, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 5-28.  
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Whatever we take the artwork to be, then, it must be the sort of entity which possesses the 
properties we attribute to artworks, or otherwise makes sense of the claims we make, in 
appropriate practices of interpretation and appreciation.  The critical practice constraint is 
an acknowledgement of the fact that artworks, unlike such things as stars and water 
molecules, have no existence independent of human interests and practices.  As David 
Davies puts it, ‘the very notions of “art” and “artwork” are parasitic upon [critical] practice—
artworks just are the things that play a particular kind of role in a particular kind of 
practice’.3 
Davies and Gregory Currie argue at length that a central tenet of critical practice is 
that the artwork is something achieved by the artist.  Judgments about the quality of an 
artwork, Currie argues, rely centrally on knowledge about what the artist achieved in 
creating it.4  Davies develops at length the idea that grasping the artwork involves 
recognizing an artistic statement that has been finely articulated in a medium.5  Davies and 
Currie agree that these insights about appreciation of artworks require us to attend carefully 
to the artist’s creative activity.  Indeed, they hold that the artwork should be identified with 
that creative activity rather than with any object or structure the activity gives rise to.  On 
Currie’s view, the true artwork is the action-type of discovering a certain structure through 
a certain process (which he refers to as a ‘heuristic path’).6 
Davies, too, holds that the artwork is to be identified not with a structure produced 
or presented by the artist, but with the artist’s generative act.  Davies argues that our 
intuitions and statements about an artwork cannot coherently be made true of one and the 
same entity.  Some statements, particularly about what is achieved through the work, refer 
to the artist’s creative activity, while other statements, such as those about formal features, 
refer to the ‘focus of appreciation’ (that is, the physical object, performance, conceptual 
structure, etc., presented by the artist for our attention).7  Davies holds that it is only by 
attending carefully to the artist’s generative activity that we can appreciate the statement 
the artist has articulated.  For this reason, in appreciating the artwork we are in effect 
appreciating that activity; and this shows that the artwork should be seen as equivalent to 
the activity, not to the focus of appreciation.8 
It is quickly obvious that Currie’s and Davies’ views fail to preserve the truth of many 
intuitive statements about artworks.  For instance, it will be false to say of Picasso’s artwork 
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon that it hangs in the Museum of Modern Art, that it has a patch of 
brown in the upper left corner, or that it depicts women in a brothel, since these are not 
properties of the action Picasso undertook in creating the painted canvas.  However, Currie 
and Davies hold that their views provide the best way of making another important set of 
 
Richard Wollheim’s Art and Its Objects, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980) and Arthur Danto’s The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) are also deeply informed by an implicit 
critical practice constraint. 
3 Davies, Art as Performance, p. 21. 
4 Gregory Currie, An Ontology of Art (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), esp. pp. 36-40.   
5 Davies, Art as Performance, pp. 52 ff.   
6 Currie, Ontology, esp. pp. 66-71.  By ‘structure’, Currie refers to such things as ‘a certain 
pattern of lines and colours, structure of sounds, or sequence of words’ (p. 47).   
7 Davies describes a focus of appreciation as the ‘outcome or product of a generative 
performance on the part of one or more individuals’ (Art as Performance, p. 26, emphasis in 
original).  Though there are differences between Currie’s notion of a structure and Davies’s 
notion of a focus of appreciation, nothing hangs on this point for the sake of the present 
argument.  I will use the term ‘focus of appreciation’ to describe the product of the artist’s 
activity in relation to both Currie’s and Davies’ views.  
8 Davies’ view diverges from Currie’s in that Davies holds, on the basis of reasons I will not 
rehearse here, that it is preferable to see the artwork as a particular token of creative 
activity rather than an action-type. 
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critical and appreciative statements come out true: namely, such statements as ‘Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon was revolutionary.’  Picasso’s action, which was committed in a 
certain context with certain considerations in mind and in response to particular art-
historical developments, clearly has the characteristic of being revolutionary.  But the 
characteristic of being revolutionary cannot be appropriately attributed to a piece of canvas 
with pigment on it, since an object with exactly the same physical properties could have 
been produced through a completely different generative act, perhaps with nothing 
revolutionary about it.9   
An advantage of Currie’s and Davies’ views is ontological unity: on Currie’s view, 
every artwork belonging to whatever form or genre is an action-type, while on Davies’ view 
every artwork is an action-token.  Thus even the distinction between singular arts (like 
painting and carved sculpture) and multiple arts (like most cast sculpture and music for 
performance) turns out to be insignificant as it concerns the ontology of artworks, for in 
every case the work is simply the artist’s (type or token) generative act, and a generative 
act belongs to the same ontological category regardless of what is thereby created or 
discovered.  Moreover, as Currie points out, his view is ontologically conservative, assigning 
all artworks to a familiar category: actions belong to the category of events, a respectable 
category that seems necessary to any viable account of the world. 
 I agree with Currie’s and Davies’ claim that critical practice makes evident a very 
intimate connection between the artwork and the activity of the artist.  This is true also of 
standard institutional practice: upon acquisition of contemporary artworks, curators and 
conservators collect extensive information from artists to guide their practices of storage, 
conservation, and display.  Even after a work has been in a collection for many years, the 
artist, if still living, may be consulted about restoration or invited to the institution to 
participate in installation.10  These practices reveal that the artist is taken to have special 
authority about the nature and disposition of the work.  In what follows, I will appeal to 
widespread institutional practices of individuation, treatment and display of artworks as well 
as to practices of appreciation and interpretation, which tend to depend upon and be 
responsive to the former.   
 While agreeing that the artist’s activity is centrally important to the artwork, I 
disagree with the conclusion that we must therefore see the work as identical to that 
activity.  It is in fact possible to account for all of the properties we commonly and 
appropriately attribute to artworks without referring them to two different entities.  To 
account for achievement-related aspects of the work, even while identifying the work with 
the focus of appreciation, we can appeal to relational properties: every focus of appreciation 
has the property of having been created through a certain process.  Thus everything 
required to account for achievement-related properties does belong to the focus of 
appreciation proper.11  Of course, if we identify the focus of appreciation with a particular 
physical object (in cases where such an object is available), then the problem of modal 
properties will arise: if, as seems plausible, the focus of appreciation has its process-related 
properties essentially, but the physical object does not, the identity and persistence 
conditions of the two kinds of entity will differ.12  But rather than driving us to the view that 
 
9 For such an argument, see especially Currie, Ontology, pp. 50-53. 
10 For description of actual cases, see Sherri Irvin, ‘The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary 
Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (2005), 315-326; and ‘Museums and the 
Shaping of Contemporary Artworks’, Museum Management and Curatorship 21 (2006), 143-
156. 
11 Kathleen Stock makes a similar point in her review of Art as Performance, Philosophical 
Quarterly 55 (2005), 695.   
12 Robert Stecker argues that this concern can be dealt with by allowing that two distinct 
physical objects of different kinds can occupy the same spatiotemporal position.  As we will 
see, though, some artworks cannot plausibly be construed as identical to or constituted by 
physical objects even on this more liberal notion.  See Stecker, ‘The Ontology of Art 
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the ‘true’ artwork is an action, this observation should lead us to develop an account of the 
focus of appreciation that does not identify it with a physical object construed independently 
of its relational properties.  It is to this task that I now turn. 
 
Artworks as things the artist creates 
An appropriate understanding of the critical practice constraint should lead us, then, to turn 
our attention to the focus of appreciation.  I will present an account of the artwork, 
construed as a focus of appreciation, that incorporates all the properties that are 
appropriately attributed to artworks in practices of interpretation and appreciation.  As this 
account has been argued for in detail elsewhere,13 I will focus here on showing how the 
account applies to a particular contemporary artwork and some hypothetical variations on it, 
and showing how it allows us to account for the idea that the work is something achieved by 
the artist while satisfying the widespread intuition that an artwork is an entity created and 
presented by the artist for our perusal, not the artist’s activity of creation and presentation.    
In my view, artworks acquire their features through a diverse array of art-making 
activities.  In addition to making or selecting some physical object, structure, event, 
process, or state of affairs, the artist often specifies details of presentation, which may 
include acceptable venues and physical configurations.  Even works in the traditional genre 
of painting are partly constituted by the specification of an acceptable configuration: every 
traditional painting has an orientation that counts as right side up (as was highlighted by 
Georg Baselitz when he stipulated that his paintings were to be hung so that their 
representational content was upside down).  The artist may also specify certain properties 
related to the meaning of the work, such as the title; and this will constrain how it is 
appropriate to interpret the work.14  I describe this determination of the work’s properties 
through the artist’s acts of art-making as the artist’s sanctioning of certain features of the 
work. 
Not all sanctioning of artwork features is done explicitly.  Established artistic genres 
involve conventions that determine some of the work’s features.  For example, a traditional 
painter did not have to declare that all future paint flaking is irrelevant to the nature of the 
artwork.  Instead, traditional paintings fall under a strong convention to the effect that, 
when arms break off sculptures and paint flakes off paintings, we do not come to see them 
as armless-artworks and flaking-artworks, or interpret their subjects as armless humans or 
landscapes punctuated by strange, irregularly shaped patches of emptiness.  Ordinarily, 
unless the artist explicitly stipulates otherwise, damage to the objects the artist created is 
not interpretatively relevant.  It is not, then, necessary for the artist to explicitly sanction 
every one of a work’s features either by giving the object certain characteristics or by 
saying something about whether the work has this or that feature; if it were, then no work 
would ever be completed, because an infinite number of possible features would have to be 
ruled out.  The artist’s sanction determines the artwork’s features in the context of 
conventions that specify default artwork boundaries. 
Many such conventions are defeasible.  It is perfectly open to a contemporary artist 
to stipulate that the flaking of a painting is a bona fide feature of the work.  The Japanese 
Gutai artist Saburo Murakami did just that.  In 1957, he created a series of Peeling Off 
paintings which are such that the flaking paint is interpretatively and evaluatively 
 
Interpretation’, in Stephen Davies and Ananta C. Sukla (eds.), Art and Essence (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 177-191, section IV. 
13 Irvin, ‘The Artist’s Sanction’. 
14 However, simply giving the work a title is not sufficient to imbue the work with particular 
representational content.  Whether or not the artist has made a picture of, say, a banyan 
tree will depend partly on our conventions and practices for decoding pictorial 
representations, partly on what banyan trees actually look like, and so forth.   
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relevant:15 when we consider what the work accomplishes, we should consider such things 
as the statement that is made by embracing the flaking of the paint, and the beauty or 
ugliness of the surface that emerges as the paint flakes. 
It should be mentioned that not every statement made by the artist serves to 
sanction features of the artwork.  I distinguish between the features of the work and its 
interpretation, where the latter is constrained but not wholly determined by the former.  
The artist has the authority to sanction the work’s features, but not (directly) to fix the 
appropriate interpretation of the work.  When artists make statements about messages 
purportedly conveyed by their works, for instance, these statements ordinarily have no 
more force than those of ordinary interpreters.16   
It is also possible for an artist to try but fail to establish a sanction about something 
that does fall within the domain where sanctioning is possible.  If the artist’s preference 
about configuration of the work is not expressed clearly, or is mistakenly expressed to a 
museum visitor who happens to resemble the curator, then no sanction has been 
established.  And if the artist makes contradictory statements, or expresses preferences 
that it would be dangerous or impossible to carry out within the framework of the 
institution, it may be necessary to rely on art world or institutional conventions to resolve 
the issue of what we should take to have been sanctioned.17 
In typical cases, many of the work’s features are sanctioned simply through the 
artist’s act of making a particular physical object.  Kandinsky’s application of paint to canvas 
was the act through which he sanctioned most of the features of his works.  He also 
sanctioned a configuration of the artwork, namely that a particular orientation counts as 
right-side-up.  But, as we will see, in some instances the creation of the work doesn’t 
involve the artist’s making or even selecting a particular object.  In such instances there is 
no plausible identity or constitution relation that could hold between the artwork and a 
particular physical object.   
The artwork, then, is the entity that realizes the parameters sanctioned by the artist.  
The artist’s acts of creation and presentation are acts of articulating this entity, and they 
shape the properties of the entity in ways that are relevant to appreciation and 
interpretation.  The ontological status of the entity will differ from case to case: in some 
instances it may be a particular physical object, or a particular token event, while in others 
it is any assemblage of objects that satisfies the conditions specified by the artist.  In some 
instances, indeed, the artwork may be a generative activity that eventuates in some 
physical object or structure; some works of performance art, such as those of Yves Klein’s 
happenings during which paintings were created, are best described in this way.    
It might be thought a cost of my account that visual artworks do not end up 
belonging to a single ontological category.  However, insofar as focuses of appreciation 
appear to belong to diverse ontological categories even on the views of Currie and Davies,18 
it is not clear that my account ultimately requires more categories than theirs.  Moreover, it 
is a virtue of my view that it allows us to distinguish between certain works of performance 
art, where what is presented for our attention really is the artist’s creative activity, and 
traditional visual artworks where the entity presented for our attention is a physical object 
appropriately displayed. 
 
The ontological diversity of artworks 
 
15 Paul Schimmel, ‘Intentionality and Performance-Based Art’, in Miguel Angel Corzo (ed.), 
Mortality Immortality? The Legacy of 20th-Century Art (Los Angeles: Getty Conservation 
Institute, 1999), p. 137. 
16 For further discussion, see Irvin, ‘The Artist’s Sanction’. 
17 Space constraints prevent me from discussing this important issue in detail.  Some such 
cases are treated in Irvin, ‘Museums’.   
18 I see no denial of this claim in Davies’ or Currie’s works.  Moreover, insofar as ontological 
unity is to count as an advantage of their views, it must be the case that focuses of 
appreciation are ontologically diverse. 
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If we take artworks to acquire their features through a process of sanctioning by the artist, 
as I suggest, we must conclude that artworks are ontologically diverse.  This is because 
artists, implicitly or explicitly, sanction different kinds of entity in different cases.  To 
illustrate, I will consider a particular contemporary artwork and a number of hypothetical 
variations on it.  Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s 1991 Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) involves a 
pile of hard candies in colourful wrappers.  The particular hard candies displayed on a given 
occasion are not essential, however: viewers are invited to consume them as desired, and 
gallery staff periodically replenish them, in accordance with Gonzalez-Torres’s instructions.  
The size of the pile is ideally determined by weight: it should add up to 175 pounds of 
candy.  But even this isn’t definitive.  Whenever someone takes candy out of the pile, the 
weight will be less than ideal.  And, presumably, gallery staff don’t weigh all the candy when 
they add to the pile; they just attempt a visual approximation of the initial installation. 
Untitled relates to the death from AIDS of Gonzalez-Torres’s lover, Ross Laycock, 
and the ideal weight of the pile is related to Ross’s ideal body weight.19  So the work, while 
appearing fun-loving and light-hearted, in fact explores issues of mortality and of the 
squeamishness and fear surrounding AIDS: since this is a portrait of Ross, we are 
symbolically consuming him, although many would have been reluctant even to touch him 
during his illness.  Untitled and other consumable candy works by Gonzalez-Torres are also 
compelling in an art context, even for those who know nothing about Ross and his death 
from AIDS: it can be wonderful, after spending a day in a museum looking hard at beautiful 
and perplexing and remote things, to be able to pick up a piece of an artwork and lay claim 
to it, or, better yet, to be able to eat it and appreciate its sweetness.  There is something 
generous about these works (and something interesting about the way they enlist the 
museum in this generosity).  The candy works also raise questions about the nature of the 
experience we expect and receive from art.  We tend to treat artworks as great cultural 
treasures, but is the enrichment we receive from them, especially after museum fatigue has 
set in, really greater than the fleeting but real and immediate enjoyment of a piece of 
candy?  To what extent should artists play to the viewer’s desire for a reward?   
It should be immediately clear that this work is not like a traditional sculpture.20  
Every particular physical component is replaceable; indeed, the work can survive 100% 
replacement of the candies.  For traditional sculptures, on the other hand, every physical 
component is essential, and if a piece is lost it cannot simply be replaced by a look-alike.21 
 Gonzalez-Torres’s work, then, is not identical to the particular candies that are 
dumped on the floor the first day of the exhibition.  One might think, however, that the 
work is identical to a particular pile of candy, where a pile of candy is a physical entity that 
can survive the gradual replacement of all the particular candies it contained when it was 
first constituted.  This possibility is interpretatively attractive, in that a pile of candy is 
similar to a human body in this respect: human bodies are physical objects that survive the 
gradual replacement of their physical components.  In this way, then, the construal of the 
work as a pile of candy would connect it to the body of Ross.22 
 
19 Sautman, Anne, Self-Guide: Modern and Contemporary Art at the Art Institute (Chicago: 
Art Institute of Chicago, 2003), p. 8. 
20 Neither, though, is it purely conceptual.  Comparison of Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) 
with other Gonzalez-Torres works, such as the 1991 Untitled (Placebo), involving 1000 to 
1200 pounds of candies wrapped in silver and displayed in a neat rectangular array on the 
floor, shows that Gonzalez-Torres gives sculptural attention to the visual details of his work, 
and visual appearance is part of what viewers should and do consider in appreciation and 
interpretation. 
21 See Mark Sagoff, ‘On Restoring and Reproducing Art’, The Journal of Philosophy 75 
(1978), 453-470, for discussion of this point in relation to the Vatican restoration of 
Michelangelo’s Pietà.  Of course, replacement parts can supply considerable information 
about what the original was like; but to encounter even an excellent replica is not to 
encounter the original work. 
22 I am grateful to Jason Southworth for this point. 
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 If the work were a pile of candies, however, the work would cease to exist whenever 
the pile ceases to exist.  Were the curators negligent in restocking the candies on a busy 
weekend, the work might accidentally be destroyed.  And were the museum to discard the 
remaining candies between exhibitions, they would have destroyed the work.  But in fact, 
there is nothing in critical or institutional practice to support the idea that the work can be 
destroyed in this way, or that it is an entity with discontinuous existence.  Works of this 
type, which involve the assembly of new materials for each display, continue to belong to 
museum collections, and are spoken of by critics in the present tense, even when years 
elapse between exhibitions.23  Moreover, regarding the work as existing discontinuously 
would make it out to be a very odd sort of thing indeed: a non-contiguous entity in 4-
dimensional spacetime, made up of a series of piles. 
 
 Gonzalez-Torres’s work thus has a complex relationship to any particular pile of 
candies through which it is presented: it clearly is not identical to the pile, and it is 
constituted by some pile or other at most partially and intermittently, like a soul moving 
from body to body.  Before considering the actual work’s ontological status further, let us 
consider some alternatives, superficially similar to Untitled. 
1) In selling the work to the museum, the artist delivers a particular 175-pound 
batch of candy, with instructions that, for display, the candy is to be placed in a pile 
in the corner of the room.  No mention is made that the candy may be eaten. 
2) The work resembles the actual case in all respects, except that the artist’s 
instructions specify that when all the candies have been eaten, they are not to be 
replenished. 
3) The instructions are the same as in the actual case (the candies may be eaten 
and are to be periodically replenished), but the museum curator decides that visitors 
should not be allowed to eat the candies.  Thus the presentation ends up being the 
same as that specified in 1. 
4) The work is like that in case 2, except that the artist stipulates that the work 
may legitimately be presented anywhere, at any time, if his instructions are 
followed.24  When all the candies have been eaten, then, a new instance of the work 
may be constructed, just as a musical work may be performed again after a 
particular performance has ended.25 
How should we understand the work in cases 1-4?  It seems clear that in case 1, we should 
see the work as a case of sculpture.  The artist is presenting the pile of candies as an 
artefact to be put on display, stored between exhibitions, and so forth.  In the absence of 
any indication to the contrary, the candies will be treated by the institution as essential to 
the work, and will thus be subjected to careful storage and conservation procedures. 
It is clear that this work functions, interpretatively, quite differently from the actual 
work: it does not offer the same sense of generosity; it does not challenge the taboos 
associated with AIDS in the same way; and, rather than poking fun at the distance that 
institutions often impose between artworks and viewers by subverting it and allowing the 
candy to be consumed, it pokes fun at this distance by preserving it and directing it at an 
object with respect to which such distance seems completely ridiculous.  The work still 
 
23 Another prominent example is Jana Sterbak’s Vanitas: Flesh Dress for an Albino 
Anorectic, exhibition of which requires that a dress be sewn from large pieces of flank steak. 
24 Sol LeWitt’s wall drawings function in this way: he allows that anyone who follows his 
instructions precisely will have constructed a genuine LeWitt, whether or not LeWitt is aware 
of or authorizes the activity.  
25 One might wonder whether the actual work should be regarded as an abstract entity, 
such that each pile of candies is a token or instance of the work.  While I think that criticism 
and institutional convention regarding this and similar works supports the idea that they are 
singular entities rather than multiply instantiable abstractions, I will leave this matter aside 
for the present.  The 4 cases are sufficient to establish the ontological diversity of artworks, 
regardless of the verdict about the actual work. 
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comments on many of the same issues, but coldly and sarcastically rather than in a playful 
and inviting way: since Ross has AIDS, we cannot physically engage even with his symbolic 
stand-in; since artworks are precious objects with which we are not permitted to engage, 
we cannot eat even a simple, easily replaceable piece of candy on the floor of a gallery, as 
long as it is part of an artwork.  This version of the work takes the institutional imposition of 
distance as an unfortunate given, a lamentable convention that we’re stuck with, whereas 
Gonzalez-Torres’s actual work, rather than adopting such a defeatist mode, proposes that 
this distance is something art can light-heartedly shed.  The nature of the commentary that 
this work makes on matters of institutional distance depends upon its essential constitution 
relation to a particular physical object that will be protected and conserved by the museum.    
The work described in case 2 is different, in important ways, both from the actual 
work and from the work described in case 1.  Because eating of the candies is permitted in 
case 2, this work doesn’t maintain the sense of institutional distance present in case 1.  But, 
whereas the actual work is characterized by inexhaustibility and generosity, and gives us a 
tribute in which the artist’s love for Ross is immortalized, the work in case 2 confronts us 
very firmly with the finiteness of things.  Each time we take a piece of candy, we must 
recognize that we are hastening the work’s demise, just as Ross’s demise was hastened by 
his disease.  Should we eat a piece and thus enjoy the full experience of the work, or should 
we be frugal, simply imagining what it would be like to eat one of the candies, so that the 
work can last longer?  Who will eat the last candy, and thus consign the work forever to 
oblivion?  Seeing the work as essentially constituted by a particular physical object allows us 
to understand it as making a particularly poignant commentary on mortality.  However, as 
we see by comparing case 2 with case 1, ontological status is only one factor among others; 
works belonging to the same or similar ontological categories can have quite different 
interpretative contents. 
Now consider case 3, in which the instructions are exactly as in the actual case: the 
pile is ideally 175 pounds, but it is permissible for audience members to eat the candies; the 
pile is to be replenished indefinitely.  However, a curator decides, for some reason, that 
audience members are not to be allowed to eat the candies; or perhaps museum guards are 
ignorant of the instruction that the candies may be eaten, and thus they prevent audience 
members from approaching them. 
Notice that what the audience will experience, in case 3, is just what they would 
have experienced in case 1.  And the evolution (or lack thereof) of the pile of candies will 
also be the same as in case 1.  But should we therefore interpret the work as being different 
than it is in the actual case?  No: the fact that a curator makes a decision to present things 
incorrectly doesn’t change what the work itself is or how it should be understood.26  It might 
make it harder for audience members to grasp the work, just as hanging a painting upside-
down might make it more difficult for the audience to grasp the work.  But it does not 
change what it is appropriate to say in interpretation or evaluation of the work.  Only the 
artist can make decisions that will change the work’s properties (unless the artist explicitly 
yields that power to others).  For this reason, the work in case 3 is the same as in the 
actual case, despite the fact that the presentation differs.  And the ontological status of the 
work in case 3 differs from that of the work in case 1, though the presentation is equivalent. 
Let us now turn to case 4.  In this case, the artist’s sanction determines that the 
work is an abstract entity, since it may have more than one instance.  The work is to this 
extent similar to works for performance, such as musical and theatrical pieces.  However, 
 
26 It is possible for a curator-cum-artist to constitute a new work through appropriation and 
(perhaps non-standard) display of items created by others, as when Garry Neill Kennedy 
proposed that all landscape paintings in a particular wing of the National Gallery of Canada 
be re-hung at his eye level.  However, such interventions do not change the original work; 
Kennedy’s intervention did not make it the case that the original works he appropriated are 
now such that they must be hung at his eye level.  For discussion of cases of incorrect 
installation, or conflict between the artist and the museum about appropriate display, see 
Irvin, ‘Museums’. 
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since the work is in the genre of contemporary visual art, where most works are singular 
rather than multiple, the permissibility of multiple instances becomes interpretatively 
relevant.  Because the work can always be newly instanced after a particular instance goes 
out of existence, the eating of the last piece of candy loses much of the poignancy it would 
have had in case 2 (since, in case 4, it isn’t really the last piece).  The work becomes a 
meditation less on mortality and loss than, perhaps, on the way in which a person’s spirit 
can live on and be reconstituted in different forms through the survival of those who knew 
and loved him.  The work in case 4 seems fundamentally more optimistic than that in case 
2, and this interpretative fact is closely related to its ontological status as an abstract entity 
permitting multiple instances. 
These examples illustrate two important points.  First, as I described in the previous 
section, the artist’s art-making role is not exhausted by the creation of a physical object.  
Gonzalez-Torres’s art-making activity didn’t involve making an object, or even specifying a 
particular object.  Instead, he sanctioned the features of his work through acts related to 
presentation: by communicating instructions to the museum, giving the work a title, and so 
forth.  Through these art-making activities, he made it the case that Untitled involves the 
presentation and periodic replenishment of a (roughly) 175-pound pile of candies that can 
be eaten by viewers.  And by these same activities, he made it the case that the artwork is 
not identical to or essentially constituted by any presented pile.  Through a different set of 
decisions, however, he could have made a work that was essentially constituted by a 
particular pile of candies, or a work that was an abstract entity, susceptible of multiple 
tokenings. 
Second, there is a fit between the ontological status of the work and the 
interpretative properties that are appropriately attributed to it.  When the artist chooses, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, to make a work that is essentially constituted by a particular 
physical object, this makes available certain kinds of interpretative content that could not 
have belonged to the work had the artist’s sanction determined that it was, instead, a 
multiply instantiable type.  Ontological status, like other elements of a work’s form, is a 
resource artists can use to imbue their works with meaning.  Acknowledging differences in 
the works’ ontological status allows us to acknowledge important differences in the works’ 
interpretative contents as well.   
 
Artworks, physical objects, and parameters 
I’ve suggested that because of the nature of the art-making process, the artwork can come 
unmoored from any particular physical object.  Gonzalez-Torres’s actual work cannot 
plausibly be thought to be identical to, to be essentially constituted by, or to have as a 
component any particular physical object, even one construed loosely, such as a pile.  
Moreover, the nature of the process by which artworks are created makes it the case that 
artists have it in their power to create different kinds of entity.  Gonzalez-Torres could have 
made an artwork on the model of a sculpture, as in case 1, or an artwork on the model of a 
musical work, as in case 4.  But he in fact made neither of these, opting for an artwork that, 
while not a multiple, can survive the destruction of any particular physical object or 
assemblage through which it is presented. 
But can’t we, nonetheless, find some interesting and informative things to say about 
the ontology of such works as a class?  Isn’t it still the case that the works are essentially 
tied to or constituted by or composed of physical objects in a way that would allow us to say 
something about what they all have in common, ontologically?  It seems to me that going 
down the path of trying to find unifying claims to make about the ontology of such works is 
likely to mislead us, at best.  We might be tempted to say, for example, that Kandinsky’s 
Improvisation No. 7 is a painted canvas, whereas Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s work is a pile of 
candy that is allowed to be eaten.  But surely Kandinsky’s work is an object in a quite 
different way than Gonzalez-Torres’s work is.  Gonzalez-Torres’s work, if it is a pile of 
candy, isn’t any particular pile of candy (even if we admit, as I think we should, that a pile 
of candy can survive a 100% replacement of its parts).  For each time the work is put on 
display, a new pile of candy will be made.  Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, the work 
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continues to exist even when there is no pile of candy: even if the museum throws away all 
the old candies in between exhibitions, and has no objects in storage at all in relation to this 
work, the work itself has not been destroyed.  The situation is quite different for 
Kandinsky’s work: this work centrally involves a particular object and cannot go on existing 
if that object is destroyed. 
Given widespread pre-theoretical intuitions, it seems attractive to maintain, 
whenever we can, that an artwork is a physical object.  But even in the easiest sort of case, 
it will be at best misleading to say that the artwork is simply a physical object.  Kandinsky’s 
Improvisation No. 7, perhaps the most straightforward sort of case, is not simply a physical 
object; it is, at best, a physical object considered in a certain way, where the artwork 
cannot be grasped in the absence of such consideration.  The object must be considered 
with the correct orientation, right-side-up rather than upside down or sideways.  And, 
should some dirt begin to accumulate on its surface, or should a piece of paint flake off, it 
will not thereby become a dirty-work or a flaked-paint-work.  Thus, if we wish to maintain 
that the work is a physical object, we must say that it is a physical object considered as 
though it were appropriately oriented and in pristine condition.  The actual painted canvas 
that we see in the museum might not have all of these features; so gaining access to the 
artwork must involve going beyond what we see.  Thus even a traditional painting is, at 
best, a physical-object-considered-in-a-certain-way; and the way in which it must be 
considered may well diverge from the way it actually is.  A characterization offered by Amie 
Thomasson seems to fit such works: they are ‘individual concreta (bearing physical 
properties perhaps among others) constituted by physical objects, but not identifiable with 
their constituting matter.’27 
However, I have suggested that Gonzalez-Torres’s work Untitled (Portrait of Ross in 
L.A.) is not a physical-object-considered-in-a-certain-way, since the work has a continuous 
existence, whereas no physical object that would be a candidate for an identity or 
constitution relation to the work exists continuously.  To what ontological category, then, 
does the work belong?  And if this ontological category is indeed viable, why can’t 
ontological unity be preserved by assigning all artworks to this category? 
The details of the case require that Gonzalez-Torres’s work be construed as an 
individual concretum not essentially constituted by a physical object.28  The work can 
continue to exist in the absence of any particular physical object or assemblage; however, it 
is not an abstract entity on the model of a type or kind, since it is not susceptible of having 
multiple tokens or instances.  The nature of the concretum is determined by a set of 
parameters for presentation expressed by the artist: the work is such that presentation of it 
involves the construction of a 175-pound pile of candy that audience members are allowed 
to consume, and that the museum is to replenish periodically. 
It should be noted that even if it is possible to unite Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) 
with Kandinsky’s Improvisation No. 7 under the label ‘individual concreta’, this does not 
 
27 While regarding this as the most plausible construal of the view that artworks are closely 
associated with physical objects, Thomasson does not explicitly endorse this 
characterization.  Amie Thomasson, ‘The Ontology of Art’, in Peter Kivy (ed.), The Blackwell 
Guide to Aesthetics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), p. 82. 
28 In drawing the distinction between abstract and concrete entities in a way that allows that 
an entity may be concrete without being partly constituted by a physical object, I am 
informed by Gideon Rosen’s discussion of the Way of Abstraction in ‘Abstract Objects’, in 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/abstract-objects/.  A particular marriage 
or a particular bank account would also count as a non-physical concretum on this account 
(although, as in the case of an artwork that is a non-physical concretum, many physical 
events and states of affairs will be relevant to its having come into existence and acquired 
the properties it possesses).  On some ways of drawing the abstract/concrete distinction, of 
course, such entities, though singular, will be termed abstract simply because they are not 
physically constituted.   
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eliminate the ontological diversity of artworks.  First, it is clear that ontologically diverse 
entities can be described as individual concreta: there is no reason to expect a common 
ontological account of the pebble caught in the tread of my boot, my present, occurrent 
thought about that pebble, and the sentence-token about the pebble that I am presently 
typing on my laptop.  Second, as we saw earlier it is open to a visual artist to create a work 
that is an abstract rather than concrete entity: Gonzalez-Torres could have created a work 
that was susceptible of multiple instances, as in case 4, and said work would be abstract. 
The recognition that some artworks are concreta partly constituted by physical 
objects, whereas others are non-physical concreta or abstract entities, is not aesthetically 
ineffectual.  Creating different kinds of entities allows artists to imbue their works with 
different kinds of content.  The ability to create a work that is a concrete non-physical entity 
allows Gonzalez-Torres to make a particular commentary on the nature of persons.  
Moreover, by creating a non-physical concretum that is presented through an assemblage of 
physical objects, Gonzalez-Torres bridges the domains of conceptual and traditional visual 
art, and this is an additional source of potential critical interest.  To force works of this sort 
into the category of individual concreta identified with or essentially constituted by physical 
objects would rule out their possessing certain kinds of interpretative content that we 
appropriately attribute to them, and thereby violate the critical practice constraint.      
  Above, I stated that Gonzalez-Torres’s creation of Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) 
involved the expression of a set of parameters for presentation.  And, in general, my view 
about the artist’s sanction suggests that such specification of parameters, whether explicit 
or implicit, is a crucial part of the process of creating an artwork.  Even Kandinsky’s creation 
of Improvisation No. 7 involved the expression of such parameters: correct presentation of 
his work requires that a particular painted canvas be hung flat on a wall with the painted 
side visible, and in a particular orientation.  Why, then, can’t we identify the work with the 
set of parameters that specify acceptable presentations, such that all artworks are 
construed as abstract entities and are susceptible of being brought together within a 
common ontological category?  On such an approach, visual artworks could be treated 
jointly with musical works, which are often construed as abstract entities involving 
parameters for acceptable performances.29 
 The critical practice constraint mandates rejection of the view that visual artworks in 
general are to be identified with sets of parameters expressed by the artist, despite the 
attractiveness of such a view when applied to musical works for performance.  It seems that 
we admire particular musical performances as aesthetic objects in their own right, and that 
a substantial portion of our admiration for the musical work itself is by virtue of the 
possibilities it creates for interesting performances.  Our appreciative practices, then, 
provide some warrant for the idea that what is appreciated, when we appreciate a musical 
work, is a set of parameters: the parameters are what create the possibilities for 
aesthetically appealing performances.  Moreover, a work for performance is less 
aesthetically replete than any performance of it,30 just as any set of parameters not 
stipulating a maximally determinate set of values will be less fully specified than an object 
satisfying those parameters.  Our practices of appreciating musical works, then, make sense 
of the idea that a musical work is an abstract entity, perhaps aptly characterised as a set of 
parameters or norms for performance. 
Critical practice does not, however, treat most visual artworks as sets of norms or 
parameters.  A traditional painting is not of interest for the range of possible presentations 
 
29 For influential statements of such views, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of 
Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’.  Stephen 
Davies notes, in Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), that some musical works, such as recordings of purely 
electronic music, are not for performance; such works may not be amenable to a construal 
as abstract entities. 
30 As S. Davies notes in Musical Works, ch. 1, this relation may vary from work to work, 
with some works being much ‘thicker’ than others.  
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it creates.  The parameters for its presentation are such as to make all permissible 
presentations fall within a very narrow range: the parameters will specify that a particular 
physical object be displayed in a particular orientation, so that viewers have a similar visual 
experience each time they encounter the object.  Moreover, unlike many of the aesthetic 
properties of a performance of a musical work, the properties that are of aesthetic interest 
in a painting are not derived from a set of parameters specified by the artist; instead, most 
of the parameters (e.g., acceptable presentations of this work require the display of a 
particular painted canvas with such-and-such features) are generated implicitly through the 
application of paint to canvas.  We do not look through the presentation of a painted canvas 
to infer the set of parameters the artist expressed, treating the parameters themselves as 
of substantial aesthetic interest; instead, we appeal to the parameters (such as those 
specifying correct orientation) so as to ensure that we are grasping the aesthetic features of 
the painted canvas appropriately.  Moreover, it is not clear that a set of parameters, if it has 
any representational content at all, will have the same representational content as the 
object presented.  The parameters expressed by the artist, then, are not of primary 
aesthetic interest in such traditional cases.  To say that the artwork simply is the set of 
expressed parameters would be unjustifiably revisionist from the perspective of critical 
practice. 
The fact that traditional works of visual art are not sets of parameters, however, 
does nothing to show that no contemporary artwork is a set of parameters.  Similarly, my 
objections above to the view that artworks are in general to be assimilated to action-types 
or action-tokens do not rule out the possibility that some artworks are action-types or 
action-tokens; I take it that there are works of contemporary performance art falling into 
each of these categories.  The problem with views that attempt to shoehorn all visual 
artworks into a single category is that they deny us the resources to acknowledge the very 
real and aesthetically relevant distinctions among works that function differently and bear 
quite different relations to their art historical predecessors.  By creating works belonging to 
different ontological categories, artists may express distinct artistic content, and only a view 
that acknowledges the ontological diversity of artworks can capture this fact.31 
 
Grasping the artwork  
I have suggested that some artworks are abstract entities while others are individual 
concreta, some of which are partly constituted of particular physical objects while others, 
though not essentially constituted by physical objects, are presented by way of them.  This 
raises the question, What is the relationship between what we see in a gallery on a given 
occasion and the artwork?  The answer is that the artwork is never grasped exclusively 
through seeing: we never simply apprehend that a certain set of properties is 
interpretatively and evaluatively relevant by looking at some object, independently of rather 
detailed and specific background knowledge.  For most artworks, many of their properties 
are grasped through vision.  This is especially true for traditional paintings and sculptures.  
But invariably, even for traditional works, some properties must be grasped through 
cognition that is independent of vision.  The correctness of a particular orientation of a 
painting cannot simply be grasped through vision; for it may be that the painting has been 
hung upside down, as with a large abstract painting I once saw in a Beijing museum.  The 
relevance or irrelevance of the fact that paint is flaking off of the surface of a painting 
cannot simply be grasped through vision; one must know, independently of vision, either 
that the work falls under a convention making this fact irrelevant or that the artist has 
 
31 Dominic McIver Lopes offers an argument for the ontological diversity of architecture, 
based on the fact that sound critical practice varies cross-culturally in such a way as to have 
ontological consequences.  A similar argument might offer independent support for claims 
about the ontological diversity of visual artworks.  See Lopes, ‘Shikinen Sengu and the 
Ontology of Architecture in Japan’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (2007), 77-84. 
. 
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suspended the convention and made the flaking paint part of the work.32  Because the 
background knowledge that establishes which features of the object are relevant varies 
from case to case, there is no straightforward algorithm for inferring the artwork based on 
the physical object.  One must attend directly to the details of what the artist has 
sanctioned in the particular case.  
It might seem unfortunate that we are forced to adopt a view that says artworks are 
not simply seen.  But this fact may, in a sense, be a blessing: for it allows that even if the 
display is faulty, the audience’s ability to grasp the work may be preserved.  As any 
museum conservator knows, parts of contemporary artworks disappear on a regular basis.  
I know of one case in which over 20 percent of the pieces of an important contemporary 
artwork were stolen while the work was on loan from the museum that owns it.  Indeed, I 
once saw a contemporary artwork that included many small plastic zip-top bags, each of 
which contained a small amount of material that had been stolen from someone else’s work.  
It is clear, then, that many art objects are missing some of their physical components.  And 
then there are all the ways in which curators can get instructions slightly wrong, or be 
forced to install a work in a space for which it wasn’t initially envisioned.33  There’s the fact 
that a painting may not be hung perfectly horizontally, so the correct orientation for display 
is not quite realized.  Because grasping an artwork always involves grasping some 
properties that are not accessible through vision, and because it often involves ignoring 
outright some of the features of the object on display, these cases do not present 
insurmountable difficulties.  We can consider the painting as if it were properly hung, and 
the contemporary installation artwork as if all its components were intact.  If we do this, 
then we will have grasped the work the artist created – and this, I think, is the fundamental 
activity of the art audience: to grasp the work through both careful looking and careful 
thinking about what the artist has made.  If we succeed in this, then we will be in a position 
to interpret and evaluate artworks much more successfully.34 
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